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Abstract
This article describes and explains the evolution of Malaysia's locally owned 
banks in a series of mergers and acquisitions within national borders and beyond. 
It argues that state intervention, external economic and ﬁnancial crises and the 
liberalization of the ﬁnancial sector have compelled the consolidation of local 
banks in Malaysia. The consolidation process has resulted in the increased size 
of state-owned banks, decreased the number of local Chinese-owned banks 
and seen a decline in family shareholding in the remaining Chinese-control-
led banks. Through regional expansion both Chinese-controlled and state-
owned operations have become large-scale regionally based banking groups 
or global banks, deepening the ﬁnancial integration in ASEAN countries. 
 
Keywords: Chinese ﬁnance, bank identities, afﬁrmative policy, ﬁnancial liberalization 
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Introduction
This  article studies Malaysian banks with an evolutionary economics 
approach to describe changes of ownership, identities and develop-
ment by analysing how state intervention and the forces of globaliza-
tion have resulted in the merger and acquisition (M&A) of Malaysia's 
local banks and their expansion into ASEAN countries and beyond. 
Under the afﬁrmative action of its New Economic Policy (NEP), the 
state has been persistent in gradually consolidating Malaysia's bank-
ing industry. The state took the strongest approach and entirely re-
formed the domestic banking sector from the mid-1980s, when a world 
economic recession occurred. Next, it was the Asian ﬁnancial crisis 
(AFC) of 1997/98 that severely hit Malaysia and four other ASEAN 
countries' ﬁnancial sectors. To defend such afﬁrmative action, the 
government's banking policy has always favoured state and state- 
afﬁliated banks, which has resulted in the increased size of state-owned 
banks through M&A. In contrast, the number of Chinese family-owned 
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small and medium-sized banks has decreased over the past ﬁve dec-
ades (1970–2010). The increased liberalization of the ﬁnancial sector 
had gradually pushed the state to formulate banking consolidation 
policies to create large Malaysian banking groups to compete with 
foreign banks. The 'double forces' of state intervention and globaliza-
tion have gradually decreased family ownership of particular banks 
and progressively changed Malaysian bank ownership and identity 
so that they have become 'national banks'. Since the 2000s, Malaysian 
banks have aggressively expanded their presence beyond the national 
borders and become global operations, deepening the ﬁnancial inte-
gration in ASEAN countries and beyond.
The global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) of 2008–9 created an opportunity 
for Malaysian banks to make good deals by acquiring foreign banks in 
Malaysia and also in ASEAN countries. The GFC had an enormous im-
pact in that the near meltdown of American and European banks forced 
these banks to consolidate their businesses outside of home countries. 
Conversely, cross-border banking activity within the Asia-Paciﬁc region 
has deepened since the GFC (Remolona and Shim 2015). While European 
banks were deleveraging, banks from emerging economies and develop-
ing countries were in their expansion mode, with some Malaysian banks 
acquiring European banks operating in ASEAN countries and doubling 
their presence (Almekinders et al. 2015; Claessens and Horen 2014). The 
GFC shifted foreign banks' global activities and decreased the number 
of domestic banks through consolidation compelled by deregulation. 
In contrast, banks from emerging markets increased their presence 
abroad during and after the GFC (Claessens and Horen 2014). These 
new phenomena reﬂect the deepening of ﬁnancial integration in ASEAN 
by banks from ASEAN countries, which is evidenced in the expansion 
of banking and ﬁnancial activities of Singaporean banks in the region. 
As one of the largest ﬁnancial centres in the world, Singapore plays a 
leading role in regional ﬁnancial integration (Almekinders et al. 2015). 
Malaysian banks have also expanded abroad signiﬁcantly since early 
2000s, which is explained in detail in this article. 
Studies on Malaysian Banks
There are ﬁve important studies on the development of local commer-
cial banks in Malaysia with emphasis on history, development, owner-
ship and state intervention (Cheah 2011; Chen 2013; Cook 2008; Hara 
1991; Tan 1953). Tan (1953) provides detailed historical records of the 
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establishment and activities of the ﬁrst Chinese banks in Malaya and 
Singapore in the early years of the twentieth century. After 1953, there 
was no speciﬁc study on the development of Malaysian banks until 1991 
when Hara Fujio made an assessment of two decades of NEP impact 
on the ownership of Chinese-owned banks, revealing their decline. 
Cheah (2011) takes an evolutionary economics approach that traces the 
historical development, decline and transformation of Malaysia's early 
banks. He argues that the 1999–2001 Malaysia banking consolidation 
fundamentally transformed Malaysia's ﬁnancial landscape. However, 
Cheah's study lacks details regarding the evolution of Malaysia's banks 
and does not examine the regional expansion of Malaysian banks in post-
2001 banking consolidation. Chen (2013) explains that the conservative 
policy of Chinese banks in Sarawak constrains their development and 
so they remain small, which has made them easy targets of acquisi-
tions under the protracted afﬁrmative policy of the NEP. Cook (2008) 
examines how the government responded to consolidate Malaysia's 
commercial banks in the aftermath of the AFC and in light of the in-
creased pressure of globalization. He argues that Malaysia's banking 
policies are integral to the NEP and that its banking sector remains the 
most protected compared to other ASEAN countries.
There are several studies on the consolidation of Malaysia's banking 
industry in the aftermath of the AFC, such as banking restructuring 
process in Malaysia (Bala and Mahendran 2004; Ito and Hashimoto 
2007), selecting merger partners (Balachandher 2004) and the effect of 
banking consolidation and competition in the Malaysian banking sector 
(Muhamed Zulkhibri and Fadzlan Suﬁan 2006). 
From a management and international business perspective, Koh's 
(2018) study on the risk psyche of management professional argues 
that Malaysian Chinese-controlled banks lack intensity in terms of their 
awareness of new risk management techniques. Koh's ﬁndings could be 
different if his analysis included the important dimension of afﬁrmative 
action policy. In a study of the international expansion of Malaysia's four 
largest commercial banks, Syed Zamberi (2012) explores the reasons and 
entry strategies for Malaysia's banks' growth in ASEAN countries. From 
an international business approach, Syed's study shows that a saturated 
domestic market and the growing liberalization of the ﬁnancial and 
banking sectors in Malaysia are major push factors for large banks to 
ﬁnd new growth markets. The international expansion pattern, process 
and destinations of Malaysia's commercial banks are similar, which 
indicates that Malaysian banks tend to follow one another's steps. This 
_________________________________________________________________________77
_______State Intervention, Globalization and the Evolution of Malaysian Banks' Identities 
also indicates increased ﬁnancial integration, servicing the international 
presence of Malaysian companies in ASEAN.
Compared to Singapore's four largest banks, which started inter-
national expansion in 1909 (Tschoegl 2001), the regional expansion 
of Malaysia's commercial banks to ASEAN countries is about half a 
century behind Singapore. One common factor in local Malaysian and 
Singaporean banks' expansion abroad is deregulation of the ﬁnancial 
sector, be it in home countries or host countries, that either create more 
competition or increases growth market opportunities. Tschoegl's (2001) 
study shows four factors responsible for the international expansion 
of Singapore's top four largest banks', which include home and host 
government policies, ethnicity and family management. Out of these 
four factors, ethnicity and family management are not identiﬁed as 
responsible for the international expansion of Malaysia's state-owned 
banks in Syed's study (2012).     
This article explains the evolution of Malaysia's ﬁve largest banks 
from being mainly Chinese owned to state owned and from medium-
sized domestically based banks to large-scale regionally based bank-
ing groups in the ten ASEAN countries. The evolutionary economics 
approach applied in this study covers the formation, development, 
banking consolidation and regional expansion of Malaysia's commercial 
banks. It goes beyond the tracks laid by Tan (1953), Cheah (2011), Chen 
2013, Cook (2008) and Hara (1991). This article also describes how the 
GFC of 2008–9 created an opportunity for Malaysia's largest banks to 
expand into ASEAN countries, which Syed (2012) did not examine. In 
addition, the article traces the evolution of Malaysia's largest banks from 
their formation years, while Syed's (2012) study only focuses on the 
contemporary development and international expansion of Malaysia's 
four largest banks. 
Conceptual Framework and Research Method
This article traces how state intervention and forces of globalization have 
changed the ownership, identities, size and geographical presence of 
Malaysia's local banks over many decades. State intervention refers to 
the protracted afﬁrmative action of the NEP, which aims to eradicate 
poverty and to restructure Malaysian society. One of the strategies that 
sets out to achieve this restructuring is wealth redistribution, with the 
objective to form a Bumiputra Economic Community (BEC).1 A profound 
intervention in the reform of the banking sector is needed to expedite the 
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ascension of the BEC. Administrative power and legislative regulation 
are used to control and limit the expansion of foreign banks, while, for 
local banks, state intervention takes different forms. First, there must 
be the restructuring of equity ownership to match NEP targets. Second, 
this is done through takeover of banks that face the threat of a major 
bank run and through policies supportive of the new establishment and 
growth of bumiputera banks. Third, there must be constraining of the 
growth of non-bumiputera banks by limiting the issuance of banking 
licences. Fourth, the acquisition of Chinese-owned banks by state-owned 
bumiputera companies or banks through banking sector consolidation. 
Fifth, acquisitions of Chinese banks by state-linked non-banking entities 
is a factor too (see Cook 2008: 71–74).       
The 'forces of globalization' refers to the liberalization and deregula-
tion of the ﬁnancial sector, which have progressively increased compe-
tition in the home country as well as creating new growth markets in 
other countries. These forces of globalization also include how external 
ﬁnancial shocks such as the AFC have seriously affected Malaysian 
banks and how the GFC almost destroyed some major European and 
American banks but also created opportunities for Malaysian banks to 
ﬂex their muscles in aggressive regional expansion.  
Identity of banks refers to an organization's identity, focusing on 
the core role of an organization, its main enduring elements over time 
and the distinctive features and characteristics that determine how the 
organization is both similar to and different from others (Albert and 
Whetten 1985). This study examines the evolution of the original core 
role of early Chinese-owned banks, and their ownership structure and 
characteristics over time after they have become state-owned banks. 
Banks that remain under Chinese control share some similarities with 
state-owned banks in terms of diluted family shares ownership, capital 
size and regional expansion.  
The evolutionary economics approach is used to describe phenomena 
that have already happened over time. In this study, an evolutionary 
economics approach traces the development and changes of individual 
ﬁrms that have different historical backgrounds, characteristics and 
potential. Because each ﬁrm is unique, it is impossible to make speciﬁc 
predictions about patterns of evolution in each one. Therefore, qualita-
tive and interpretative methods are needed to explain how these ﬁrms 
have evolved. Data from previous research, company reports and press 
coverage are used extensively to trace the evolution of Malaysia's banks' 
identities.
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The ﬁve case studies in this article concern Malaysia's largest com-
mercial banks. The case study approach is adopted to examine the 
evolution of these banks; although a case study is not a speciﬁc method 
for collecting data but is regarded as a mode of organizing data in terms 
of an individual example's history and development (Goode and Hatt 
1952). The extended case studies methodology is applied to track the 
evolution of a particular bank over an extended period. Thus, it is pos-
sible to trace the changes in a bank's core role, constitutive elements 
and characteristics over time.
History of Malaysia's Local Banks
Most domestic banks established in Malaysia were mainly owned by 
and identiﬁed with the Chinese community. Early local commercial 
banks established in Malaya were generally based around Chinese clans. 
These banks were established to meet the needs of small Chinese trad-
ers. Out of the 23 commercial banks in Malaysia, 14 were established 
by the Malaysian Chinese (Cheah 2011). 
The earliest bank incorporated in Malaya was Kwong Yik (Selangor) 
Bank (1913), which had its roots in Singapore. Kwong Yik Bank was 
the ﬁrst Chinese bank founded in Singapore in 1903 by prominent 
Cantonese businessmen, largely aiming to beneﬁt the Cantonese 
community (Tan 1953). In 1920, Batu Pahat Bank Ltd was established 
in Batu Pahat, Johor by the Hokkien. In 1935, Ban Hin Lee Bank Ltd 
(BHL) was established in Penang by a prominent Hokkien, the late 
Yeap Chor Ee (Tan 1953). BHL originally focused on serving local 
businessmen in their trading and mercantile activities. In the 1960s, 
BHL branched into real estate and house ﬁnancing throughout Ma-
laysia and Singapore. The Bank of Malaya that emerged out of mining 
activities in Ipoh closed down in 1930 due to capital inefﬁciency and 
the collapse of tin prices brought by the Great Depression (Tan 1953; 
Yen 2008). Banking was one of the manifestations of Chinese dialect 
identity and competition in economic life as each dialect group excelled 
in a particular sector of the economy. On the other hand, there was an 
Indian-owned bank, the Oriental Bank of Malaya, established in 1936. 
The main function of this bank was limited to handling remittances 
from members of the Ceylonese community working in Malaya. A 
Malay-owned bank, the Malay National Banking Corporation, was 
also established in 1947 which undertook hire purchase business in 
sewing machines, motor vehicles, sarongs and musical instruments. 
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It failed in 1952 due to the lack of banking experience of its directors 
and staff and its small capital (Lim 1967). 
In Sarawak, a few Chinese banks were established. All these banks 
were traditional in their style of management and conservative in opera-
tion, being concerned with meeting the needs of local business groups 
rather than getting involved in international trading, particularly with 
the West (Tan 1982). For instance, Bian Chiang Bank was established 
in Kuching in 1924 by a Hokkien prominent businessman, Wee Kheng 
Chiang. In its early days, the Bian Chiang Bank's activities were mainly 
related to business ﬁnancing and the issuance of bills of exchange to 
the Chinese business community in Sarawak.2 Kwong Lee Bank, a 
Cantonese-owned bank started operation in 1905 in Kuching, Sarawak 
under the name Kwong Lee Mortgage & Remittance Company. The 
company granted loans against the security of export commodities 
such as pepper, rubber and other indigenous products. It also provided 
the services of remitting money of overseas Chinese to their families 
in south-east China. It later incorporated as Kwong Lee Bank Ltd in 
1934. Another bank, Wah Tat Bank, was established in 1955 by two of 
the most prominent Hokkien families. Meanwhile, Hock Hua Bank 
established in 1952 represented the interests of the Foochow people, 
emerging as a joint venture of several Foochow entrepreneurs and a 
large number of small investors to provide loans to Foochow farmers 
and traders that had been refused by the Kwong Lee Bank and Wah 
Tat Bank (Ngu 2012). These largely dialect-based banks were small and 
accounted for only a third of the total deposits in Malaya and Borneo 
in 1955; the rest was held by the British-owned Chartered Bank, Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Mercantile Bank (Supriyah 1984: 31). 
These family-owned, Sarawak-based banks were conservative in their 
management and reluctant to expand beyond the state for fear of dilution 
of their interests (Chen 2013), which eventually restricted their growth 
and so they eventually became targets of acquisitions. Table 1 provides 
a summary of the establishment of these early banks. 
Chinese family-owned banks developed and ﬂourished in the 1960s 
and played signiﬁcant roles in funding the development of Chinese 
businesses and for nation building. Nonetheless, this era also witnessed 
the emergence of 'national banks', which included shareholders of dif-
ferent ethnic groups in Chinese-controlled banks and the establishment 
of state-owned banks. Chinese businessmen who made their fortunes 
in the rubber and tin industries diversiﬁed into the ﬁnancial sector and 
facilitated industrial and property development activities (Tan 1982:159). 
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At that time, with a Chinese ﬁnance minister, it was not difﬁcult for the 
Chinese to obtain a banking licence. Several Chinese banks that were 
incorporated included the United Malayan Banking Corporation (1960), 
Malayan Banking (1960), Hock Hua Bank (1961) in Sabah, Southern Bank 
(1962), Development and Commercial Banking (1965), Kong Ming Bank 
(1965) and Public Bank (1966) (Hara 1991; Tan 1982). As the banking 
industry expanded in the 1960s, there were some M&As. In 1964, the 
Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) of Singapore acquired 
a 52 per cent majority stake in Kwong Lee Bank. OCBC was established 
in 1919 by Chinese Singaporean businessmen in Singapore to facilitate 
the growing ﬁnancial needs of the local Chinese community. 
As economic development continued to move faster and with greater 
intensity and on a much broader economic base, dialect, clan and other 
traditional Chinese characteristics began to give way in the 1960s. During 
this period, spatial and occupational mobility became more common 
and greater integration occurred among Chinese through intermarriage 
between different dialect/clan groups, which marked the beginning of 
the diminishing inﬂuence of dialect/clan relationships. 
TABLE 1: Early Commercial Banks (Locally incorporated)
Name of Bank
Places and year of 
incorporation 
Ethnic/dialect  
afﬁliation
Kwong Yik (Selangor) Bank Kuala Lumpur, 1913 Chinese-Cantonese
Bank of Malayaa Ipoh, 1920 Chinese-Cantonese
Batu Pahat Bank Batu Pahat, 1920 Chinese-Hokkien
Kwong Lee Bankb
Kuching, Sarawak, 
1934 (1905)b
Chinese-Cantonese
Bian Chiang Bankc
Kuching, Sarawak, 
1956 (1924)c
Chinese-Hokkien
Ban Hin Lee Bank Penang, 1935 Chinese-Hokkien
Oriental Bank of Malaya Kuala Lumpur, 1936 Indian
Malay National Banking 
Corporation Ltdd
Kuala Lumpur, 1947 Malay
Hock Hua Bank Sibu, Sarawak, 1951 Chinese-Foochow
Wah Tat Bank Sibu, Sarawak, 1955 Chinese-Hokkien
a Bank of Malaya operated from 1920 to 1930.
b Started as Kwong Lee Mortgage and Remittance Company in 1905.
c On 24 December 1956, Bian Chiang Bank was incorporated under the name of Bian Chiang 
Bank Ltd.
d Malay National Bank operated from 1947 to 1952. 
Source: Compiled from Tan (1953), Lim (1967), Lee (1990) and Cheah (2011).
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Emergence of National Banks and State-Owned Banks 
and the Decline of Chinese-Owned Banks
Until the 1970s, 'all of Malaysia's local banks (with two or three excep-
tions) were synonymous with Chinese business' (Hara 1991: 350). During 
this period, the presence of many small banks, predominantly Chinese 
family owned and other retail enterprises, gave an impression that the 
Chinese were dominating the Malaysian economy. In actuality, as of 
1970, Chinese ownership of the Malaysian banking sector was 24.3 per 
cent, which was far higher than the Malays (3.3 per cent) but much less 
than that by foreigners (52.2 per cent) (Malaysia 1973: 83). 
It was widely argued that the uneven distribution of wealth among 
different ethnic groups in Malaysia, largely between ethnic Chinese and 
ethnic Malays, was the principal factor that led to riots in May 1969. Fol-
lowing this tragedy, a redistributive policy was introduced in the form 
of the NEP, with a two-pronged strategy: to eliminate poverty and to 
restructure Malaysian society in a timeframe of two decades (1971–90). 
The second prong of the NEP's spirit has had great and lasting impacts 
on Malaysia's banking sector, especially in the context of increased 
economic globalization which has seen rapid changes of ownership and 
identities in Malaysia's local banks. 
Two 'national' and 'multi-ethnic' banks emerged in the 1960s: Ma-
layan Banking Berhad (MBB) and United Malayan Banking Corporation 
(UMBC). MBB was founded by Khoo Teik Puat and UMBC by Chang 
Min Thien. These banks did not have the baggage and liabilities of the 
old guard. They were not dialect based and were not identiﬁed with 
particular clans within the Chinese community. They were considered 
multi-ethnic banks in terms of ownership as well as their customer base. A 
government-owned bank, the Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) 
was incorporated in 1965 as the ﬁrst Malay commercial bank. Given the 
weak economic position of the Malays and the fact that Chinese-owned 
banks were exclusive, the establishment of BBMB was to break Chinese 
dominance in the banking industry and also aimed to increase capital 
loan options to bumiputera individuals and companies (Snodgrass 1980: 
53) as ways to advance a bumiputera entrepreneurial class.
To achieve the nation's wealth retributive policy, the NEP systemati-
cally reshaped the country's banking sector. Malaysia's banking policies 
and reform of the banking sector have been an integral part of the NEP, 
intending to restructure Malaysian society in terms of wealth distribution. 
To further the NEP's social engineering of a Malay entrepreneurial class, 
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Bank Negara, the central bank, seized an opportunity in December 1966 
and took control of MBB when it was faced with management problems 
and in danger of collapse. MBB was eventually put under government 
protection (Ranjit 1987), so the central bank had used its discretionary 
power to take control of a bank. MBB remains state owned. Thus, the 
Malaysian Chinese had not only lost control of the largest local bank 
but also the identity of that bank. Currently, MBB is Malaysia's largest 
state-owned bank or government-linked company with majority bumi-
putera interests. 
Following the central bank's takeover of MBB, the bumiputera capital 
ownership, including trust agencies, collectively owned 60 per cent of 
overall equity share in the domestic banking and ﬁnance companies by 
1980. This ﬁgure had increased to 69 per cent by June 1985 (Malaysia 
1986: 110). A study by Fujio Hara (1991: 353) shows that bumiputera 
ownership had increased to 77 per cent for the whole Malaysian banking 
industry by early 1982. The Chinese had lost out permanently in many 
of the Chinese-controlled banks, and despite the banking identity being 
synonymous with the Chinese community. 
The debt crisis of the 1970s and late 1980s and ﬁnancial sector liberaliza-
tion pushed Malaysian banking institutions through a consolidation proc-
ess to meet the requirements of the central bank, which aimed to improve 
the banking industry's competitiveness and to encourage the emergence 
of more professional management through the dilution of individual 
ownership. The central bank's view was that small Malaysian banks would 
not be able to survive once the ﬁnancial market was liberalized following 
the commitment under the General Agreement on Trade in Service in the 
World Trade Organization (Jayasankaran 1997). This period marked the 
beginning of the disappearance of some Chinese-dialect banks. 
As of 1990, only eight of the 14 Chinese-controlled banks were left, 
six Chinese-controlled banks had been taken over by the state or by 
bumiputera interests (Hara 1991). Chinese ownership of Malaysia's 
banking sector has declined from 24.3 per cent in 1970 to 10.2 per cent 
in 2004 (Malaysia 1973: 83; Malaysia 2006: 338, 357). Simultaneously, 
more and larger state-owned banks are expanding their presence in the 
domestic markets and beyond.
The AFC was another acid test for Malaysian banks. Against the 
backdrop of the AFC, many Asian countries underwent massive re-
forms in their ﬁnancial sector. The AFC affected the ﬁnancial sectors 
of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines but with varying 
magnitude. Following the crisis, each country adopted a push for local 
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bank consolidation. To enhance competitiveness, the Malaysian gov-
ernment pressed on with liberalization by getting local banking groups 
to consolidate among themselves, rationalize common functions and 
operations across institutions and outsource non-core activities. Among 
the four countries, Malaysia took the strongest state-guided approach 
and entirely reformed the domestic banking sector in the post-AFC 
years. To defend its afﬁrmative or redistributive policy and protect 
against external shocks, the state adopted a gradualist approach towards 
ﬁnancial liberalization (BNM 1999). Beck and Levine (2004) argue that 
when global trade has become more integrated, and the ﬁnancial sec-
tor becomes more globalized and exposed to external shocks, states 
will probably adopt proactive policies in the ﬁnancial sector that could 
generate growth through mobilizing of resources towards more efﬁcient 
use. For Malaysia, Cook (2008: 67) contends that before, during and after 
the AFC, the Malaysian government took a very concerted defensive 
approach to the forces of banking sector globalization; state and state-
afﬁliated banks remained in the government's favour. Cook argues that 
Malaysia's statist-nationalist banking policy remained steadfast and was 
the most resilient to pressure of globalization and protected until the 
present day. Such a policy has resulted in the increased size of state-
owned banks through M&A and a decrease in ethnic and family-owned 
small and medium-sized banks.
The result was the formation of ten anchor banks from a total of 54 
ﬁnancial institutions as at end of 2001. The aim then was to streamline 
the banking industry to withstand competition from large foreign banks 
in the process of liberalizing the domestic ﬁnancial sector. In this con-
text, small Chinese-controlled banks were absorbed into bigger banks 
and disappeared from the corporate scene. The ten anchor banks are: 
Malayan Banking, Bumiputra-Commerce Bank, Public Bank, RHB Bank, 
Arab-Malaysian Bank, EON Bank, Multi-Purpose Bank, Hong Leong 
Bank, Afﬁn Bank and Southern Bank. The government-initiated banking 
consolidation plan commencing on 1 July 2000 resulted in a complete 
reform of the Malaysian banking sector. Cook (2008) notes that from 
the late 1960s until the present, the government has always been very 
ﬁrm with its state-guided approach and had systematically reformed 
the domestic banking sector. Today there are only two Chinese-control-
led or family-owned banks left in Malaysia, namely Public Bank and 
Hong Leong Bank.
Nonetheless, as of early 2000s, Malaysian local banks are considered 
too numerous and not competitive enough compared to foreign banks. 
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Moreover, mergers of commercial banks with investment banks and 
ﬁnance companies have not achieved the desired economies of scope 
and scale (Randhawa 2011: 410). In mid-2014, an exercise of forming a 
Malaysian mega-bank was proposed and led by CIMB Group Holdings 
Berhad, Malaysia's second-biggest bank, to merge with RHB Capital 
Berhad and Malaysia Building Society Berhad (MBSB) to create Malay-
sia's largest bank. Its assets of RM629 billion would surpass Malaysia's 
largest lender, Malayan Banking Berhad's RM583.4 billion assets.3 This 
new development indicates a trend towards fewer and larger banks in 
Malaysia. Conversely, given the history of CIMB (controlled by UMNO 
(United Malay National Organization) politicians) and RHB (controlled 
by well-connected businessmen), which continue to struggle for control 
over Malaysia's ﬁnancial sector, political observers perceived that 'this 
consolidation will tightly entwine the interests of political and business 
elites in the banking sector'.4 The mega-bank proposal also implies that 
the remaining two Chinese or family-owned banks will go, most prob-
ably moving in the same direction towards M&A to become not only 
larger but also changing identity from 'Chinese-ness' to simply national 
banks with reduced Chinese or family ownership.
The external shocks of the 1980s and 1990s clearly show the increasing 
power of global forces and growing pressure on Malaysia's ﬁnancial sec-
tor reform, which is shaping Malaysian banks' ownership and identities. 
These two external shocks revealed that the government had a strong 
hand that favoured state and bumiputera interests in the domestic bank-
ing sector. The state's policy was seen as driven by the market forces of 
globalization but had never lost sight of the NEP's redistributive policy. 
However, the GFC witnessed a different form and scale of acquisitions 
by Malaysian banks, which were driven by market forces and were 
mostly cross-border acquisitions. These took place before, during and 
throughout the protracted crisis periods. During these periods, acquisi-
tions by Malaysian banks involved not only banks in the ASEAN region 
but also western investment banks in the Asia-Paciﬁc region when they 
were greatly affected by the GFC. Asian lenders, including Malaysian 
banks, perceived the 2008 GFC as a global economic power shift to the 
ASEAN region and they seized opportunities to capture strategic and 
valuable deals. The GFC had signiﬁcantly reduced the number of banks 
owned by OECD countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Conversely, the number 
of foreign banks from emerging markets were on a fast track of growth 
which had shifted the ownership structures of regio nal banking groups 
(Claessens and Horen 2014). Under the ASEAN Banking Integration 
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Framework (ABIF), such a phenomenon has deepened ﬁnancial integra-
tion for ASEAN to achieve ASEAN-wide banking sector liberalization 
by 2020 (Almekinders et al. 2015).
From 'National' and State Owned to Global Banks 
This section describes how three of the largest state-owned and bumi-
putera-controlled banks (Malayan Banking, CIMB Bank and RHB Bank) 
have evolved from a rich Chinese banking tradition with a strong banking 
foundation. These three state-owned banks are growing in size, expanding 
their presence in ASEAN markets and beyond to become global banks. 
The government's policy to promote modern domestic commercial 
banking, through measures such as the increased capital require-
ments by the central bank, effectively reduced the number of Chinese- 
controlled banks. As with state-owned banks, these three Chinese-
controlled banks also expanded, increasing their cross-border banking 
activities through the acquisitions of foreign banks in connected markets, 
but were less aggressive compared to state-owned banks. As the size 
of their assets increased, they became difﬁcult targets for acquisition 
as Malaysia's banking policies clearly favoured state-owned banks 
and bumiputera interests. Under the protracted afﬁrmative policy (see 
Chin and Teh 2017), Public Bank (PB) and Hong Leong Bank (HLB) 
have been able to gain government favour by conforming to govern-
ment policies. However, the founders and Chinese ownership in these 
banks have declined over years but still retain management control. A 
recent study claims that 'paternalism, personalism and insecurity still 
exist' among Malaysian Chinese-controlled banks (Koh 2018: 63). In the 
context of Malaysia's afﬁrmative action policy, 'insecurity' is always 
perceived as closely related to the statist policies where the remaining 
Chinese-controlled banks are always the targets for either merger or 
acquisition. Therefore, Chinese-controlled banks are always conserva-
tive rather than aggressive, like the three state-owned banks mentioned 
above. With signiﬁcantly reduced family ownership and increased state 
interest, these Chinese-controlled banks have gradually become 'national 
banks' and global banks.
The following section describes the history, formation, development, 
consolidation, regional expansion and identities of Malaysia's ﬁve larg-
est local banks. 
Malayan Banking Group
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Malayan Banking Berhad or Maybank is Malaysia's largest bank, among 
Asia's leading ﬁnancial services groups and the fourth-largest banking 
group in Southeast Asia, with assets of RM807 billion as of December 
2018. It has relatively shorter Chinese roots and tradition compared to 
the CIMB Group and RHB Group. Maybank was founded by Khoo Teck 
Puat in 1960 shortly after he left the OCBC group in Singapore. Khoo 
was a prominent businessman and his father owned stakes in the OCBC. 
Khoo controlled the Goodwood group of hotels and held signiﬁcant 
stakes in the London-based Standard Chartered Bank. He established 
Maybank with 80 former OCBC staff and within six years Maybank had 
opened more than 100 branches in Malaya, Singapore, London and Hong 
Kong. In 1963, as managing director and chief executive of Maybank, 
Khoo ﬁnanced his property investments, which include Goodwood Park 
Hotel for SGD4.8 million. Due to this impropriety, Khoo lost his position 
as managing director of Maybank. In December 1969, the Malaysian 
Central Bank effectively took control of Maybank (Ranjit 1987).
In the course of the post-AFC and state-directed banking consolida-
tion, Paciﬁc Bank and Phileo-Allied Bank (PAB) merged with Maybank 
in 2001. Paciﬁc Bank Berhad was incorporated as a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of the OCBC in 1963 after OCBC acquired the Bank of Batu Pahat 
Limited, which was established in 1920. PAB was founded in 1995 by 
Tong Kooi Ong and has shareholders of different ethnic groups with 
Avenue Assets Berhad (formerly known as Phileo Land Berhad) owning 
18.52 per cent of PAB. Avenue Assets Berhad is a diversiﬁed conglomer-
ate controlled by Mokhzani Mahathir, son of Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad (Phileo-Allied Group Annual Report 2000: 95).5 
Some analysts viewed that Tong secured a banking licence to establish 
PAB because he was linked to Anwar Ibrahim, then ﬁnance minister. 
The forced sale of PAB came right after Anwar's fall from power and 
the banking consolidation initiative in the immediate post-AFC. Tong 
was the ﬁrst to develop online banking through the PAB. Recently, Tong 
has said on his blog:
In 1995 when Phileo-Allied Bank introduced online banking and 
stockbroking, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) tried to stop 
this innovation by going to the courts. The reason was to protect their 
market share and commission rates. And after the successful launch of 
OneAccount in 1996, the first current account that pays fixed deposit 
interest rates, Bank Negara stopped the launch of the OneCorporate account 
that would have given companies the same beneﬁt. A few large banks 
protested. In the name of consolidation of the banking sector, an innovative, 
technologically superior and proﬁtable bank was forced to be sold in 2001.6 
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Since the central bank took control of Maybank in 1966, it has remained 
a state-owned bank. As of the end of 2018, Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB) owns 48 per cent of Maybank. PNB is a government investment fund 
established in 1978 as a principal vehicle of the government to achieve the 
NEP's objective of societal restructuring by promoting share ownership 
in the corporate sector among the bumiputera. PNB is Malaysia's largest 
fund management company with assets of RM298.5 billion. (PNB Annual 
Report 2018) 
So, Maybank has created for itself a new brand across Asia and be-
yond. It launched a new brand campaign in 2014 with the theme 'Bridg-
ing Worlds in Asia' in the competitive banking landscape. Maybank was 
already a regional bank in 1960 when it was established in Malaysia. 
Today, with more than 2,600 ofﬁces in 18 countries, it connects many 
across Asia in terms of their ﬁnancial needs. The Maybank brand has 
a presence in all ten countries of the ASEAN, the three global ﬁnancial 
centres of Hong Kong, London and New York, the two biggest emerg-
ing markets of China and India, the Middle East and other countries. 
Maybank is one of the top 500 most valuable global brands.7
Maybank has been on an accelerated track of acquisition since the 
mid-1990s, buying stakes in other banks of different regions to stay 
competitive as the ﬁnancial sector is increasingly globalized. Maybank 
has a strong presence in Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. It has 
been operating in Singapore since it was incorporated in 1960. In 2011 
Maybank strengthened its securities business by acquiring Singapore 
brokerage ﬁrm Kim Eng Holdings Limited, adding a new entity to its 
Malaysian investment banking operation, Maybank Investment Bank 
Berhad. The acquisition of Kim Eng gives Maybank instant access to 
investment operations in Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Maybank perceived Kim Eng as a perfect complement 
to its existing strengths in investment banking and the equities market 
to transform Maybank into a regional powerhouse.8 Now the Maybank 
Kim Eng Group has ofﬁces across Southeast Asia, the USA and UK. It has 
been involved in several high-proﬁle deals in the region. As at December 
2018, Maybank's total assets in Singapore were SGD73.3 billion.
The Maybank brand entered the Indonesian market in 1995 when it 
commenced a joint-venture with PT Bank Nusa Nasional. Maybank has 
gained greater visibility in Indonesia after its acquisition of PT Bank 
International Indonesia (BII) from Temasek (Singapore's state-owned 
investment company) and Kookmin (South Korea's biggest bank) who 
jointly hold a controlling interest of about 55.6 per cent. Subsequently, 
Maybank secured 97.5 per cent of BII in a deal amounting to US$2.7 
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billion. The acquisition took place when global bank stocks had plum-
meted by 33 per cent in 2008.9 Its presence in the Philippines began in 
1997 after it acquired PNB Republic Bank in 1997 and renamed the bank 
as Maybank Philippines Inc. Maybank as a ﬁnancial group is growing 
in size, increasing its presence in the region and beyond. In this it has 
some similar development strategies to those of the CIMB Banking 
Group and RHB Banking Group, which have rapidly expanded their 
international investment banking operations.
CIMB Bank Group
CIMB Bank Group, with assets of RM534.1 billion, is Malaysia's second-
largest bank and the ﬁfth-largest banking group in Southeast Asia. It is 
one of the largest Asia-Paciﬁc investment banks (excluding Japan) and 
a leading ASEAN universal bank (CIMB Annual Report 2018). CIMB is 
an ASEAN catalyst that has a footprint across all ten ASEAN countries, 
connecting people and markets for economic growth. 
CIMB is state owned, with Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Employee 
Provident Fund and Pension Fund as substantial institutional share-
holders. CIMB has a strong Chinese heritage in banking that can be 
traced back to the establishments of Bian Chiang Bank (BCB), Ban Hin 
Lee Bank and Southern Bank. CIMB also has a Malay root and tradition 
that can be traced to the establishment of Bank Bumiputera Malaysia 
Berhad (BBMB). BBMB has a 'Chinese touch'. In its formative years, 
prominent Chinese businessmen Robert Kuok and Khoo Kay Peng 
were appointed directors in 1966 to assist the bank (Gomez 1999: 102). 
CIMB's early change of ownership and identity occurred when the Wee 
family who founded BCB sold their 36 per cent stake to UMNO-owned 
Fleet Group in 1975. Four years later (1979), the Fleet Group completed 
its acquisition of BCB and led to the formation of Bank of Commerce 
Berhad and retained the acronym brand name of BCB (Gomez 1990: 36). 
By the 1980s, BBMB became the largest bank in the country in terms 
of assets and was the ﬁrst Malaysian bank to have operations in New 
York, London, Tokyo, Bahrain and Hong Kong.
In October 1999, BBMB recovered from the AFC and other ﬁnancial 
problems to merge with Bank of Commerce Berhad, resulting in the 
formation of Bumiputra-Commerce Bank (BCB), which was the biggest 
merger in Malaysian banking history under the control of Commerce 
Asset Holdings Berhad (CAHB). In 2005, CAHB announced its decision 
to create a universal bank by combining its commercial and investment 
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banks. In an aggressive M&A, in March 2006, CIMB launched a hostile 
takeover of Southern Bank, which was one of the ten anchor banks an-
nounced in 1999. Southern Bank is an enlarged Chinese-controlled bank 
with a strong foundation after it merged with Ban Hin Lee Bank in 2001, 
in the post-AFC banking consolidation process. CIMB Group recognized 
Southern Bank as an important player in wealth management products, 
credit cards and SME lending that are Chinese dominant. Southern 
Bank was the ﬁrst in the country to set up the MEPS/ATM system used 
throughout Malaysia today. After enlarging its consumer banking sec-
tor, BCB was rebranded to have its current name, CIMB, in 2006. The 
takeover of Southern Bank added a valued niche player in consumer 
banking to the group. The merger combined the extensive resources of 
BCB with the expertise and agility of Southern Bank. The CIMB chief 
felt that CIMB needed to proceed with the takeover of Southern Bank to 
complement the banking franchise it was trying to build. It was a hostile 
takeover because Southern Bank had been an important ingredient in 
helping effect the turnaround in CIMB's consumer franchise.10 From this 
merger, CIMB formed a regional universal banking group that aims to 
be 'Southeast Asia's Most Valued Universal Bank' and embarked on a 
rebranding exercise including unveiling a new logo and a new tagline, 
'Forward Banking', reﬂecting its promise to create value for customers 
through forward thinking.11 In other words, CIMB has created a new 
identity in the ASEAN countries.
A context of increased liberalization of the banking sector, in which 
size and efﬁciency matter, led the leadership of the CIMP Group to 
position itself as an ASEAN bank by building up its ASEAN franchise. 
It attempts to emulate the model of 'too big to fail' banks such as Gold-
man Sachs and JP Morgan of the United States, which have huge inter-
national investment banking operations. CIMB's expansion strategies 
are quite similar to that of Malayan Banking and RHB Bank. In 2004, 
CIMB formed 60:40 joint-venture with the Principal Financial Group 
of the USA, a New York Stock Exchange-listed global ﬁnancial service 
company, which resulted in the formation of CIMB-Principal Asset 
Management Berhad (CIMB-Principal). CIMB-Principal has regional 
investment capabilities in Malaysia with a regional footprint covering 
Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. Now CIMB was on a 'shopping 
spree' to expand its international investment banking operations. In 
2005, it acquired GK Goh Securities Pte Ltd which led to the formation 
of CIMB-GK Securities Pte Ltd, strengthening CIMB's international 
investment banking operations. GK Goh was founded in Singapore in 
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1979, evolving into a reputable Pan-Asian stockbroking franchise with 
operations in Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the UK and the USA. 
CIMB Group also ﬂexed its muscles during the 2008 GFC when al-
most all western banks of great size were forced to sell their operations 
abroad. Yet CIMB Group strengthened its presence in Southeast Asia 
and connected itself to global ﬁnancial centres and large economies that 
have linkages with ASEAN. To achieve this aim, CIMB Group acquired 
a 19.99 per cent stake in the Bank of Yingkou in 2008, adding mainland 
China to the group's network. In the same year, CIMB Group created 
the sixth-largest bank in Indonesia after the group merged PT Bank 
Niaga Tbk with PT Bank Lippo Tbk. The merged bank was rebranded 
as 'CIMB Niaga' in Indonesia. Also in 2008, CIMB acquired a 93 per 
cent stake in BankThai PCL, which ﬁrmed up CIMB Group's universal 
banking platform across major ASEAN markets and made the Group's 
retail network the widest in ASEAN. BankThai was rebranded as 'CIMB 
Thai' and its new brand and logo were unveiled to the public in May 
2009 as part of CIMB Thai's transformation into a ﬁnancial institution 
that offers innovative products and services to the Thai market. 
In September 2009, CIMB Group set up retail banking services in 
Singapore. The retail banking component complements CIMB Group's 
existing securities, advisory and corporate lending businesses in Sin-
gapore. Then in November 2010, CIMB Group spread to Cambodia. In 
April 2012, CIMB had purchased some of Royal Bank of Scotland's (RBS) 
Asian investment banking business in the Asia Paciﬁc for US$142 mil-
lion. RBS's operations in Asia-Paciﬁc markets include Australia, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia and Thailand. The acquisition aims to make CIMB one 
of the top three Southeast Asian banks in terms of assets and return on 
equity. In underwriting capital market deals for the Asia-Paciﬁc, data 
indicate that CIMB beat DBS Group Holdings Ltd and HSBC Holdings 
Plc, while RBS trailed at number 35. For takeovers, it trumped Morgan 
Stanley, Credit Suisse Group AG and Goldman Sachs, with RBS lagging 
behind at number 19.12
CIMB Group is emerging as a top regional ﬁnancier for mergers 
and acquisitions. In late 2012, CIMB provided some of the ﬁnancing to 
Overseas Union Enterprise Ltd's S$9 billion counterbid for Fraser and 
Neave Ltd.13 The deal marked CIMB Group as the top of the regional 
M&As league in Southeast Asia for 2012. CIMB is also growing its cross-
border M&A deals. For instance, it helped to broker a billion-dollar 
deal which saw private equity ﬁrm CVC Capital Partners buying 98 per 
cent of PT Matahari Department Store, Indonesia's largest supermarket 
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chain, owned by the Lippo Group.14 CIMB was also involved in the 
Songkhla-based Sri Trang Agro-Industry PCL and Malaysia Smelting 
Corp Berhad's listing on the Singapore Exchange and Genting Singapore 
Plc's S$1.8 billion (US$1.4 billion) perpetual bond sale in 2012. 
As a state-owned bank, the lender is beneﬁting from Malaysian com-
panies, especially state-owned companies, that are pushing ahead with 
initial public offerings (IPO) even as markets worldwide are affected 
by Europe's protracted debt crisis. CIMB was principal adviser and 
managing underwriter for the Malaysian portion of IHH Healthcare 
Berhad's US$2.1 billion dual listing on the Kuala Lumpur and Singa-
pore stock exchanges in July 2012. It helped raise US$3.3 billion for 
Kuala Lumpur-based plantation owner Felda Global Ventures Holdings 
Berhad, Malaysia's biggest in 2012 IPO after Facebook's US$16 billion 
share sale. IHH Healthcare Berhad, a Malaysian government-controlled 
company is Asia's largest hospital operator. Felda Global Ventures, also 
a Malaysian-government controlled company is the world's third-largest 
oil palm plantation operator.
CIMB follows in the footsteps of some large US banks in these regional 
markets. However, its three-way merger exercise to create Malaysia's 
largest bank in mid-2014 did not materialize. 
RHB Bank Group
RHB Bank Group is the fourth-largest ﬁnancial group in Malaysia, 
with total assets of RM243.2 billion (RHB Bank Annual Report 2018). 
It has the deepest Chinese heritage in ﬁnance and banking compared 
to Maybank and CIMB. RHB Bank started in 1997 from a merger be-
tween two Chinese founded banks – Kwong Yik Bank and D&C Bank 
(Development and Commercial Bank). Kwong Yik Bank was Malaya's 
ﬁrst local bank and D&C Bank was founded by H.S. Lee in 1966. Lee 
was a well-known entrepreneur and the ﬁrst minister of ﬁnance of Ma-
laysia. D&C Bank became the ﬁfth-largest Malaysian bank by the late 
1980s. In 1982, Maybank increased its share ownership of Kwong Yik 
Bank from 50.4 per cent to 51.4 per cent (Lee 1987: 328). In 1986 the Lee 
family surrendered management of D&C Bank, following Lee's death. 
In 1990, Abdul Rashid Hussain, a politically well-connected corporate 
ﬁgure, bought a majority shareholding of D&C Bank from the Lee 
family. In 1996, Rashid Hussain acquired a controlling stake in Kwong 
Yik from Maybank. A year later, Rashid merged Kwong Yik Bank and 
D&C Bank and formed RHB Bank to become the third-largest integrated 
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ﬁnancial services group in Malaysia. RHB Banking Group recognized 
its founding year as 1913, which was same as that for Kwong Yik Bank 
(Selangor). The group celebrated RHB Bank's 100th anniversary in 2013. 
Internally, the group has built a diverse and performance-centric culture 
in its workplace. 
RHB Bank can be traced to another Chinese-owned bank, the United 
Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC). As of 1976, UMBC was Malay-
sia's third-largest bank, ranked after Maybank and Bank Bumiputera. 
UMBC was the ﬁrst commercial bank established in independent Ma-
laya in 1960 by a group of businessmen, led by Chang Ming Thien, a 
prominent ﬁgure in the rubber industry in Malaya and Singapore. Pernas 
(National Corporation), a wholly owned government company, through 
its growth strategies to indigenize key economic sectors in the country, 
seized the opportunity to obtain control of UMBC when it suffered the 
fate of Malayan Banking in 1966. UMBC ran into ﬁnancial problems in 
1976, which led to government intervention due to suspected frauds by 
the directors who had issued loans to companies owned by themselves. 
The subsequent restructuring of the bank gave even more opportunity 
for bumiputera to have larger share ownership in UMBC. In May 1985 
the then Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin acquired outright control 
of UMBC and then sold it to Pernas for a lucrative proﬁt in 1986. As of 
the early 1990s, Pernas has held an 85.7 per cent stake in UMBC and 
suffered massive loans taken to acquire the bank. Following this and 
the poor returns on this investment, Pernas was forced to sell UMBC in 
1992 to Datuk Keramat Holdings, a bumiputera company that was with-
out previous banking experience. After that the bank was involved in 
several ﬁnancial improprieties, including disbursement of questionable 
loans. Sime Darby, a publicly listed but state-controlled conglomerate, 
bought UMBC in 1996 (Searle 1999: 74; Gomez and Jomo 1999). Sime 
Bank declared a loss of RM1.8 billion during the AFC. The troubled Sime 
Bank was then absorbed by RHB Bank in 1999. The processes of M&A 
in RHB bank since its incorporation until the acquisition of Sime Bank 
indicate the preferences of the state and power of individual bumiputera 
such as Rashid Hussain that had gained control of a major slice of Ma-
laysia's ﬁnancial sector within a short period. The post-AFC banking 
consolidation led to the merger of Utama Banking Group (UBG) into 
the RHB Banking Group. This M&A involved tough negotiations with 
RHB founder Rashid Hussain, who sold his entire 23.9 per cent stake 
to UBG in 2003. Under  UBG group management, RHB went through a 
volatile period to deal with the group's debt restructuring plans, when 
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it was without top management leadership.15
Since 2007, RHB Banking Group has been controlled by Malaysia's 
Employee Provident Fund. The restructured banking group has ambitions 
to be ASEAN's third-largest bank by 2020. RHB Group also has a regional 
expansion plan like Maybank and CIMB, that made their big foray into 
Indonesia during the 2008 GFC. In 2008, RHB Investment acquired a 49 
per cent stake in Vietnam Securities Corp. RHB chose to be more cautious 
about spending too much. Its strategy was to acquire mid-sized banks 
such as PT Bank Mestika Dharma in Indonesia in 2009. However, it failed 
to get approval from the Financial Services Authority of Indonesia.
Just like Maybank and CIMB, the increased competition in the do-
mestic market and the intensiﬁcation of globalization of the ﬁnancial 
sector has pushed RHB Banking Group to take an inorganic approach 
to expand its investment banking in the fast-growing Southeast Asian 
economies by acquiring OSK Holdings Berhad, a stockbroking company, 
in 2012. This acquisition gave an instant boost to RHB's investment bank-
ing operations in Southeast Asian markets such as Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Hong Kong and China. This strategy 
enabled the RHB Group to capture a surge in mergers and stock deals 
in Southeast Asia. This enlarged merged entity increases its ability to 
compete in Asia with global players such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley. RHB has grown in size and was ranked seventh in Southeast 
Asia for underwriting domestic bonds and eighteenth for share sales in 
2013,16 while in terms of assets it ranks thirteenth in 2019.17
Public Bank Group
The Public Bank Group is the third-largest banking group in Malaysia 
by asset size, with those standing at RM419.69 billion at the end of 2018. 
During the NEP period, Public Bank pursued a bumiputera policy and 
was the ﬁrst Malaysian local bank to have a Malay Chairman – Tan Sri 
Nik Ahmed Kamil, an inﬂuential member of the UMNO ruling party 
(Bowie 2006: 78: Tan 1982: 282). Most non-bumiputeras regarded the 
NEP as a disincentive but the founder of Public Bank Berhad (PBB), 
Teh Hong Peow, recognized its potential. Public Bank was accordingly 
granted 'Approved Status' by the ﬁnance minister for meeting all of the 
central bank's priority lending guidelines and for fulﬁlling the NEP's 
bumiputera ownership and employment quotas. Approved status also 
enables PBB to accept government deposits (Bowie 2006: 107). As early 
as 1980, it attained the prescribed goal, reaching a 31.2 per cent equity 
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stake in the bank and consistent with the national agenda (Bowie 2006: 
210). By abiding by its afﬁrmative policy, PBB was given licences. By 
1990 the bank had 90 bank branches and 78 ﬁnance company branches 
(Bowie 2006: 211, 214, 215).  
PBB, as a well-managed bank, survived the ten critical anchor bank 
consolidation process of the domestic banking system post-AFC. It was 
the least affected among other local banks by the AFC and emerged 
relatively unscathed. Under the ten anchor bank consolidation direc-
tive, PBB acquired Hock Hua Bank in 2001. Public Bank also acquired 
Sime Merchant Bank in 2000 (Bowie 2006: 218, 266). Today, PBB is the 
largest non-governmentally linked bank and the fourth-largest company 
listed on the KLSE in terms of market capitalization. The Public Bank 
Group has two listed entities on the KLSE, namely PBB and Loanpac 
Insurance Berhad.
Since the 1990s PBB has been a regional bank. In January 1990, it 
made a signiﬁcant move to acquire Public Finance Limited, Hong Kong 
(formerly known as JCG Finance Company Limited) as the bank's ﬁrst 
overseas subsidiary. Since 1992, PBB has entered Sri Lanka, Vietnam and 
Cambodia. In late 1992 it became Malaysia's ﬁrst bank to open a branch 
in Myanmar and the same in Laos. In June 2006, PBB reached another 
milestone in strengthening its regional ambition after it acquired Hong 
Kong's Asia Commercial Bank (ABC) for HK$4.5 billion. ABC was re-
named as Public Bank (Hong Kong) Limited and has 32 branches, with a 
branch in Shenzhen and representative ofﬁces in Shanghai and Shenyang, 
China. On the domestic front, PBB acquired Kuala Lumpur Mutual Fund 
Berhad in 1993 and renamed it Public Mutual. Public Mutual became a 
100 per cent-owned subsidiary of PBB in July 2006. As of 2019, PBB has 
expanded its regional network to 265 locations, with 77 branches in Hong 
Kong, four branches in China, 31 branches in Cambodia, 18 branches in 
Vietnam, four branches in Laos and three branches in Sri Lanka.
The founder's ownership of the bank's equity had dropped from 48 
per cent to 40 per cent during 1983–89, while the bumiputera share also 
decreased from 31.5 per cent to 25.9 per cent. Conversely, in the context 
of the state's relaxation of foreign participation in the domestic ﬁnancial 
sector, foreign shareholdings in the bank rapidly increased from 18.5 
per cent to 29.8 per cent in the same period (Hara 1991: 354). As of end 
2013, the founder's total ownership of the bank had further decreased 
to 23.41 per cent (Public Bank Annual Report 2018: 261).  
The pro-state and bumiputera bank policies coupled with potential 
external shocks led PBB to propose a RM5 billion rights issue, the larg-
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est by a local ﬁnancial institution in recent years. This quantum cash 
call in May 2014 surprised the market. Even more surprising is that the 
founder and chairman subscribed his entitlement in full. The size of the 
fundraising indicates that the bank is fortifying its capital base beyond 
its requirements. This raises the question of why the 84-year-old banker 
would commit approximately RM1.2 billion of his own money to bolster 
the bank, which has been left to professional managers. According to 
the value of the bank, analysts calculated that a RM1.2 billion capital 
infusion by the founder will immediately triple its value to RM4 bil-
lion. The total amount raised has far exceeded the capital requirements 
under Basel III and the central bank's requirement, which means that 
the bank is now over-capitalized. Some bankers and analysts reason 
that the founder wants to ensure that he leaves PBB as his legacy and 
that the bank needs to be over-capitalized so it is able to overcome 
future economic downturns or certain regulatory requirements. The 
rights issue is aimed at strengthening PBB's capital base, in light of the 
implementation of the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process, 
or ICAAP, and additional capital ratios imposed by the central bank 
and to avoid any eventualities of being controlled by the central bank 
in the future.18 
Hong Leong Bank Group
The Hong Leong Bank Group is Malaysia's ﬁfth-largest banking group 
with RM202.9 billion in total assets. It has sales and business centres 
in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Cambodia and China 
(Hong Leong Bank Annual Report 2018). Hong Leong Bank Berhad 
(HLBB) has more than a century of experience in the mortgage and 
remittance industry since it was founded in 1905 in Kuching, Sarawak, 
under the name of Kwong Lee Mortgage and Remittance Company. It 
was incorporated as Kwong Lee Bank Ltd in 1934. The Lim family who 
founded the bank maintained their ownership and management until 
1982, when the bank was acquired by Chinese tycoon Khoo Kay Peng, 
of the MUI Industry Group in Kuala Lumpur. The bank was renamed 
Malayan United Bank Berhad in 1983. Subsequently, it was renamed 
MUI Bank Berhad. The chairman of the bank in the early 1980s was 
Tunku Osman Tuanku Temenggong Ahmad, a member of the Johore 
royal family. Khoo realized that he would not be able to expand the 
bank's operations with the increased regulation of the sector. So, he 
divested his entire stake in MUI Bank in 1993 to Quek Leng Chan of the 
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Hong Leong Group in Malaysia, which had been in the ﬁnancial services 
industry since 1968 through Hong Leong Finance Berhad (Gomez 1999). 
The Hong Leong Group's acquisition of MUI Bank revealed Quek's close 
links with Anwar Ibrahim, the then ﬁnance minister, who exempted the 
takeover 'from complying with Malaysia's banking rules which limit the 
shareholdings of any individual corporate shareholder of a bank to no 
more than 20 per cent' (Gomez 1999: 155–156). MUI Bank was renamed 
Hong Leong Bank Berhad in October 1994. 
The post-AFC state-led ten anchor bank consolidation ended Wah 
Tat Bank's operation after it became part of Hong Leong Bank in 2001. 
Another Chinese-owned bank, Kong Ming Bank founded by the late 
Ling Beng Sung in Sarawak in 1965, had become part of HLBB after the 
group acquired Edaran Otomobil Nasional (EON) Bank in 2011. Kong 
Ming Bank was sold to EON, the national Proton car distributor, in 1992 
which marked the birth of EON Bank Berhad.19 The acquisition of EON 
Bank transformed HLBB into a banking group of more than RM170 bil-
lion in assets as of December 2013. 
The Hong Leong group expanded its acquisitions abroad by acquir-
ing two Hong Kong banks, the Dao Heng Bank in 1987 and then merg-
ing with Hang Lung Bank in 1989. In 1992, the group bought another 
Hong Kong bank, the Overseas Trust Bank. The group also acquired 
the Benchmark Bank Plc, renaming it Dao Heng Bank (London) plc. 
The group sold off its shares in Dao Heng Bank to Singapore's DBS 
Bank for RM10 billion (Gomez 1999: 154). HLBB's regional expansion 
has continued, as it bought a 19.99 per cent (RM877.5 million) stake in 
a small-sized commercial bank based in Chengdu, China in 2007 and 
became the ﬁrst Malaysian bank to enter the Chinese banking sector.20 In 
the same year, HLBB entered the Vietnam market with a wholly owned 
commercial bank operation. In 2013, it began wholly owned commercial 
bank operations in Cambodia too. 
Conclusion
Malaysia's protracted afﬁrmative action policy in the economic sphere 
and the increased liberalization of the ﬁnancial sector have led to four 
major changes in the number, size, structure of ownership and identities 
of Malaysian banks. First, the number of local banks has been reduced, 
small banks have disappeared, and both state-owned and Chinese- 
controlled medium-sized domestic banks have grown to become large-
scale global banks that have spread their presence in ASEAN countries 
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and beyond. Their size and cross-border expansion makes for more 
broad-based business activities, an ability to clinch big ﬁnancial deals, 
increased capital base and opportunities to establish a regional brand 
which have deepened the ﬁnancial integration of ASEAN countries. 
Second, state protectionism of local banks in Malaysia that favoured 
state-owned banks and bumiputera interests resulted in the fading of 
the 'Chinese-ness' of banks, with them instead becoming national and 
regional banking groups or global banks. 'State-owned banks continue to 
have a signiﬁcant presence in several ASEAN countries' (Almekinders et 
al. 2015: 13–14). As shown in this article, Malaysia is one of the ASEAN 
countries that has three state-owned banks expanding their presence in 
the region. All three state-owned banks discussed in this article adopt 
similar strategies, in that they have acquired strategic stockbroking com-
panies – be these local or foreign – to expedite their regional presence 
in investment banking in ASEAN and beyond. However, Chinese-con-
trolled banks are very careful with their expansion plans because they 
cannot afford to make any mistakes that may lead to the possibility of 
being controlled by the central bank. 
Third, the 2008 GFC created a global economic power shift to the 
region, which prompted three of Malaysia's largest state-owned banks 
to seize opportunities to capture strategic and valuable deals while cer-
tain European banks were withdrawing their business operations in the 
region. This shows the power of the state; in the case of Malaysia, the 
state is resilient to the pressure of globalization of the ﬁnancial sector. 
Conversely, meanwhile, 'foreign bank presence has become somewhat 
less global' (Claessens and Horen 2014: 22).
Fourth, in the context of a structural shift in the global banking sys-
tem with the increased presence of banks from developing countries in 
ASEAN countries, a nation such as Malaysia shows its increasing role 
in the ASEAN economy and ﬁnancial markets.
A ﬁnal note for the awareness and attention of readers is that Malay-
sia's infamous 1MDB mammoth scandal had no impact on Malaysia's 
local banks, but it seriously affected two European banks' operations 
in Southeast Asia.
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1  Formerly known as Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community or BCIC.
2  The prominent Wee family who founded Bian Chiang Bank were founding members 
of the United Overseas Bank in Singapore in 1971.
3  Bloomberg 2014. 'CIMB, RHB to Combine in $22.3 Billion Three-Way Merger'. https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-09/cimb-rhb-in-three-way-merger-to-form-
largest-bank-in-malaysia.
4  KiniBiz 2014. 'The Politics and Business of Bank Mergers'. http://www.kinibiz.
com/story/opinions/97360/the-politics-and-business-of-bank-mergers.html.
5  FinanceAsia 2000. 'Mahathir's Son Says No to Maybank Takeover'. https://www.
ﬁnanceasia.com/article/mahathirs-son-says-no-to-maybank-takeover/31212. 
6  'Say No to Corporate Kings'. http://www.tongkooiong.com/2013/10/say-no-to-
corporate-kings.html.
7  Akhyari Hananto. 2018. 'Southeast Asian Banks on the Rise: Most Valuable Banks 
in Southeast Asia 2018'. https://seasia.co/2018/03/24/southeast-asian-banks-on-
the-rise-most-valuable-banks-in-southeast-asia-2018.
8  The Edge Markets. 2011. 'Maybank Acquires Kim Eng'. https://www.theedgemar-
kets.com/article/maybank-acquires-kim-eng.
9 Bloomberg 2008. 'Maybank to by Indonesian Bank as Temasek Renews Bid (Update2)'. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTHFJIhjSLV4.
10  The Star 2012. 'CIMB Poised to Emerge as Top Regional Financier for Mergers and 
Acquisitions'. https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2012/11/20/
cimb-poised-to-emerge-as-top-regional-ﬁnancier-for-mergers-and-acquisitions/.
11  The Edge Markets. 2009. 'MMVB 2009: Delivering on Its Regional Promise'. https://
www.theedgemarkets.com/article/mmvb-2009-delivering-its-regional-promise.
12  Bloomberg 2012. 'CIMB Set to Take on Goldman with “Audacious” RBS Purchase'. https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-24/cimb-set-to-take-on-goldman-with-auda-
cious-rbs-purchase.
13  OUE made the S$9.08 per share offer, which works out to S$13.1 billion for F&N, 
countering the offer of S$8.88 (S$9 billion) per share made by Thai billionaire Charoen 
Sirivadhanabhakdi of the Pokphand Charoen group, who has interests in the food 
and agribusiness, retail and distribution as well as telecommunication industries.
14  The Star 2012. 'CIMB Poised to Emerge as Top Regional Financier for Mergers and 
Acquisitions'. https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2012/11/20/
cimb-poised-to-emerge-as-top-regional-ﬁnancier-for-mergers-and-acquisitions/.
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15  The Edge Malaysia 2009. 'Cover Story: Back in the Race'. https://www.theedgemar-
kets.com/article/cover-story-back-race.
16 Bloomberg 2013. 'RHB Seeks Higher Regional Deals Ranking with OSK: Southeast Asia' 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-29/rhb-seeks-higher-regional-deals-
ranking-with-osk-southeast-asia.
17  Revolvy.com. 'List of Largest Banks in Southeast Asia'. https://www.revolvy.
com/page/List-of-largest-banks-in-Southeast-Asia.
18  The Star 2014. 'Teh's Extra Oomph for Public Bank'. https://www.thestar.com.my/
business/business-news/2014/05/03/tehs-extra-oomph-for-public-bank-founder-
tan-sri-teh-hong-piow-is-forking-out-rm12bil-as-part-of-the/.
19  The Edge Markets 2010. 'Cover Story: EONCap a Sitting Target for Predators'. https://
www.theedgemarkets.com/article/cover-story-eoncap-sitting-target-predators.
20  The Star 2007. 'HLB Buying into China's Chengdu Bank'. https://www.thestar.
com.my/business/business-news/2007/10/26/hlb-buying-into-chinas-chengdu-
bank/.
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